

Revenue Decoupling Mechanisms

*The New York State
Experience*

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Overview

- **Description of RDMs**
- **History of RDMs in New York State**
- **Current Status of RDMs in NYS**
 - **Outstanding issues**



Impediments to Energy Efficiency

- Traditional Cost of service regulation
 - $R = B * r + O$
- Fixed costs (depreciated over time) + commodity costs (recovered as expenses)
 - If sales are not realized, will not recover their fixed costs – lost margin, net loss for the utilities
- Creates throughput incentive



Revenue Decoupling

- Does not incentivize, but should remove the disincentive
- Eliminates the link between volumetric sales and utility revenues/profits
 - Otherwise, lost margins, EE cost recovery for the program, and opportunity costs
 - **E.g. 2% reduction in sales can lead to 20% reduction in shareholder earnings**



Revenue Decoupling (cont'd)

- Decoupling is achieved by adjusting the rate per unit of commodity sold in proportion to the amount of sales lost by decreased or increased demand
- Reduces regulatory lag between rate cases
- Utilities can still increase profits by adding more customers



Revenue Decoupling Mechanism Variations

- Revenue per Customer
- Sales margin per customer
- Total margin revenue
- Total class revenue
- Usage per customer



Alternatives to RDM and Comparative Advantages

- Lost Revenue Adjustment Mechanism
- Straight fixed variable rate design
- Fully cost-based service



Utility Approach to RDMs

- Issues that utilities have to consider:
 - Type of mechanism (based on rate filing)
 - Service classifications
 - Should certain SCs be exempt?
 - Treatment of customers switching SCs
 - How to assure data quality & accuracy
 - Forecasting customers and their average usage



RDMs in Practice

- Benefits for EE achieved
- Customer satisfaction with RDMs
 - JD Power & Associates
- Weather and recession normalization?
 - **Otherwise holding utilities harmless no matter the cause or whether related or not to energy efficiency**



Other Regulatory Considerations*

- **Balancing/Carrying Accounts**
- **Revenue Banding**
- **Rate banding**
- ***Ad hoc* adjustments**



*Source: NARUC, Decoupling FAQ (2007)

RDM History in New York State

- Originally mandated around 20 years ago, then PSC backed off
- James Gallagher, from the NYC Economic Development Council:
 - RDM “could not be isolated as a factor driving the increase in DSM expenditures”
 - **State EE goals + DSM incentives?**
 - Other concerns included skewed price signals, large accruals, volatility, reduced development incentives



RDM Implementation Order

- In April 2007, the NY PSC directed all public utilities to
 - “develop and implement mechanisms that true-up forecast and actual delivery service revenues and, as a result, significantly reduce or eliminate any disincentive caused by the recovery of utility fixed delivery costs via volumetric rates or marginal consumption blocks.”
- PSC revisited RDM as the best option to sever the throughput incentive



RDMs Implemented:

Company	Type	PSC Status
Consolidated Edison	Electric & Gas	Approved
Orange & Rockland Utilities	Electric	Approved
Central Hudson Gas & Electric	Electric & Gas	Approved
National Fuel Gas Distribution Corporation	Gas	Approved
National Grid/Niagara Mohawk (Keyspan)	Gas	Pending
New York State Electric & Gas	Electric & Gas	Developing
Rochester Gas & Electric	Electric & Gas	Developing

Progress?

- Consolidated Edison
 - Electric
 - Gas
- National Grid/Keyspan
- National Fuel Gas
- NY PSC actually seems to prefer hybrid approach:
 - RDM for large market customers (residential) +
 - Fully cost-based rates for Industrial/commercial customers




Recurring Problems

- Return on equity (ROE) problems – should ROE be reduced proportionately to the risk reduction?
 - Reduces risk & makes cost of capital cheaper – some advocate reduction of allowed ROE, balanced by improvement in credit rating
- Rate impacts – is volatility unfair for customers?
- Supports poor management?
 - Only interim measure though



Figure: Impact of Revenue Change on Return on Equity (ROE)



Source: SEPA, *Decoupling Utility Profits from Sales*

Decoupling = Profitability?

- Utilities can still increase profits, even when revenues are trued-up:
 - (1) Adding customers – utilities are familiar
 - (2) Continuing allowed rate of return
 - (3) Improving efficiency lowers cost of service
 - (4) Decreased cost of capital
 - With unchanged ROE, even greater profitability
 - In the end, utilities are insulated from most common profit shocks



Issues for Utilities

- Return on equity issues – should be encouraging higher ROE?
 - Weather normalization vs. ROE reduction
- Still does not actively incentivize EE
 - Should utilities be the ones promoting EE?
- Requires investment of resources – opportunity cost issue again
- Better to be discussing true-ups in general rate cases?



Questions?

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