
LOCATING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN A 21ST CENTURY LEAST COST PLANNING ENVIRONMENT

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Sources and Notes:

Gold, Rachel, Laura, et. al., Energy Efficiency in the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009: Impact of Current Provisions and Opportunities to Enhance the Legislation, American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, September 2009),

McKinsey Global Energy and Material, Unlocking Energy Efficiency in the U.S. Economy (McKinsey & Company, 2009).

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Corporate Average Fuel Economy for MY2012-MY 2016 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis, Tables 1b, and 10. The 7 percent discount rate scenario is used for the total benefit = total cost scenario..

National Research Council of the National Academies, America's Energy Future: Technology and Transformation, Summary Edition (Washington, D.C.: 2009). The NRC relies on a study by Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory for its assessment (Richard Brow, Sam Borgeson, Jon Koomey and Peter Biermayer, U.S. Building-Sector Energy Efficiency Potential (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, September 2008).

2009 average prices are from the Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Outlook, while 2010-2030 Prices are from the Annual Energy Outlook: 2009. Adjusted.

Multivariate Comparison (Gas =1)




EXHIBIT I-2: COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF IMPERFECTIONS THAT CAUSE MARKETS TO FAIL (Citations to Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory & Resource for the Future)

TRADITIONAL NEOCLASSICAL & INDUSTRIAL BEHAVIORAL

NEW INSTITUTIONAL &

Traditional Externalities Positive	1
Negative	
Public Goods	22, a
Basic research	B, b
Information	
Learning-by-doing	C, c
Learning-by-using	D

ENDEMIC
IMPERFECTIONS
Asymmetric Information H, 9
Agency L, 4
Moral Hazard
Adverse Selection H
Perverse Incentives 1
Conflict of Interest
Inequality
Physical Capital E, e, 8
Maldistribution
Human Capital
Health
Education
Macroeconomic Imbalances
Income/
Demand
Insufficiency
Investment
Instability
Network Effects
Direct
User
Nonuser
Indirect
Cross platform
Innovation Economics
General Purpose Tech.
Producer surplus
Consumer surplus
Prosumers
Productivity
Applications

INDUSTRY STRUCTURE	
Imperfect Competition	28
Concentration	
Barriers to Entry	
Scale	f
Vertical Leverage	
Collusion	
ICE problems	
Price discrimination	
Entry barrier	
Bargaining	
Technology	B, b
R&D	2, 0
Investment	
Marketing	
Bundling: Multi-attribute	- 13
Product Differentiation	
Gold Plating	
Inseparability	
Purchase Method	
Advertising	
Cost-Price	
Level	
Structure	
Product cycle	
Disaggregated/	15
fragmented Mkt.	
Ownership	
Control	
Transfer	
Limited payback	g
Lack of premium	_
Elasticity	
Own-price	
Cross-price	
Income	
Availability	
Backward bending supp	dv
Lack	
Emergency replacement	
Poor Quality	
	. 1- 14
Regulation li	ı, k, 14
Price Distortion Avg-cos	t 20, j
Permitting	
Other Distortions	

TRANSACTION COST Search and Information Imperfect Information Availability Accuracy	E G, 10
Search Cost	12
Bargaining Risk & Uncertainty Technology Marketplace Policy Financial Liability	6, 7 h, i
Enforcement	
Switching costs Sunk costs Monitoring Costs	j g, k, 3


POWER
Legal Framework
Property
Contract
Policy
Taxation
Subsidies
Protectionism
Trade
Antitrust Enforcement
Toward Mergers
Toward Behavior
Market Dominance
Regulatory Capture

Faimess/reciprocity Altruism Preference Custom Social group & status Perception Bounded Vision/Attention Prospect Framing Loss Avoidance
Custom 17 Social group & status Perception Bounded Vision/Attention Prospect L, 24 Framing
Social group & status Perception Bounded Vision/Attention Prospect Framing L, 24
Perception Bounded Vision/Attention Prospect Framing L, 24
Bounded Vision/Attention Prospect Framing L, 24
Framing
Loss Avoidance
Status Quo
Salience
Self-fulfilling Prophesy
Social Influence
Awareness
Attention
Low priority <u>Calculation</u>
Bounded rationality M, 26
Ability to process info 27
Limited understanding
Heuristic Decision Making N
Rules of thumb
Information O
Discounting
Low Probability Events
Long-Term
Small Outcomes
Execution
Bounded Willpower
Improper use Improper maintenance
Improper mannenance

EXHIBIT ES-1: TOPOGRAPHY AND NAVIGATION TOOLS FOR THE REGIONS OF KNOWLEDGE


	Regio	NS			
	IGNORANCE		VAGUENESS	UNCERTAINTY	Risk
TOPOGRAPHY					
Knowledge of					
Outcomes	Poorly defined		Poorly defined	Well defined	Well defined
Probabilities	ies Unknown Known		Unknown	Known	
Challenges Unanticipated		Contested	Nonlinear	Familiar	
	Effec		Framing	Systems	systems
Conditions	Black S	Swans	Sort of Safe	Safe	Extremely safe wit
_					(mild randomness
Distributions	Fat tai		Thin tailed	Fat tailed	Thin tailed
Payoffs	Comple	ex	Complex	Simple	Simple
CHARACTERIZATI	ONS				
Modern		wn/ Unknowns	Unknown/knowns	Known/unknowns	Known/knowns
Greek Mythology	Pando		Damocles.	Cyclops	Medusa
	Pythia		Cassandra	-,	
Catholic	Hell		Limbo	Purgatory	Reality
ANALYSIS					
Approach	Multic	criteria analysis	Fuzzy Logic	Decision Heuristics	Statistics
Tools		tv assessment	Sensitivity analysis	Scenario analysis	Portfolio
10013	Diversi	ty assessment	Sensitivity analysis	Scenario analysis	evaluation
POLICY TOOLS					evaluation
Instruments	Insura	nce/ diversity	Monitor & Adjust	Optionality	Hedging
Rules			-	•	
TECHNIOLOGY		DI ACTI CITIAN	TECHNOLOGY		
TECHNOLOGY		BLACK SWAN	TECHNOLOGY RISK ANALYSIS	TECHNOLOGY	TECHNOLOGY
RISK ANALYSIS Precaution		THEORY Truncate	Resilience	RISK ANALYSIS	RISK ANALYSIS
Buy insurance		Exposure	Adaptability	Flexibility	Resilience
for system s	_		Adaptability	Across Time	Robustness
Accept non-	urvivai	Buy insurance for system	BLACK SWAN	Across Space	Hedge
optimization		survival	THEORY		BLACK SWAN
Diversity		Accept non-	Multi-	BLACK SWAN	THEORY
Variety		optimization	functionality	THEORY Optionality	Robust to Error
Balance		Redundancy	What Works	Optionality	Small, Confined,
Disparity		Numerical			Early Mistakes
Dispunity		Functional			Incentive &
		Adaptive			disincentives
]		Avoid Moral Hazard
					Hedge


Sources: Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *The Black Swan* (New York: Random House, 2010), p.365; Andrew Stirling, *On Science and Precaution in the Management of Technological Risk* (European Science and Technology Observatory, May 1999), p. 17, *On the Economics and Analysis of Diversity* (Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, 2000), Chapter 2; "Risk, Precaution and Science; Toward a More Constructive Policy Debate," *EMBO Reports*, 8:4, 2007.




- be hedged against risk,
- maximize options to reduce uncertainty,
- be flexible with respect to outcomes that are, at best, <u>vague</u> and
- be insulated against <u>ignorance</u> of the unknown.


Univariate Approach: Levelized Cost (Gas = 1)






Sunk Costs and Construction Period





Multivariate Comparison (Gas =1)



Colorado PUC ERP

