### CADMUS





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#### Resource

Leveling the Playing Field – Regulatory Treatment of DSM Savings and Expenditures

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## **About Cadmus**



Over 400 engineers, economists, scientists and communications professionals

































	Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 1978 Northwest Power and Conservation Planning Act, 1980 Hood River Project 1983-1985 EPACT - 1992	FERC Orders 888 and 889		
Pre-70's	70's-80's	90's	00's - Today	
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### **Electric DSM Program Spending**



Source: 1990-2012: EIA 861.

Source: 2015, 2020, 2025: The Future of Utility Customer-Funded Energy Efficiency Programs in the United States: Projected Spending and Savings to 2025 (medium case), LBNL, Galen L. Barbose et al, 2013























#### **Performance Incentives**

### • Why?

- Utility investors earn a return on investments in utility owned assets.
- Typically, DSM programs do not result in a utility owned asset. Consequently, there are no earnings associated with DSM programs.
- An incentive mechanism can provide shareholder earnings to allow DSM expenditures to be considered on par with supply side resources.

















Source: STATE ELECTRIC EFFICIENCY REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS IEE Report July 2013



#### Performance Incentives by State





#### California

- Decoupling
  - Allowed revenue determined in periodic general rate cases;
  - Rates adjusted once a year based on attrition allowances
- Performance Incentive
  - 2010 2012 programs
    - Management fee equal to 5% of actual energy efficiency portfolio expenditures + 1% performance bonus (2010-2012 programs)
  - 2013-2014 programs (approved September 5, 2013)
    - Up to 8% of EE budget (minus codes and standards) based on achieving net lifecycle goals
    - Management fee equal to 3% of non-resource program budget
    - Management fee equal to 12% of codes and standards budget
    - Up to 3% of EE budget (minus codes and standards) based on conformance with ex-ante review requirements
    - Capped at \$178 million (approximately 10.85% of EE budget)



#### Ameren - Missouri

- Throughput Disincentive
  - Compensation for lost fixed-cost recovery through a shared utility cost test net benefit mechanism
- Performance Incentive
  - Additional sliding scale performance incentive
    - 0% to 4% of net benefits based on 70% to 130% of target



#### Duke - Indiana

- Lost Revenue Adjustment Mechanism
  - kWh reduction based on ex-ante savings used for cost effectiveness testing
  - Fixed cost calculated as total revenue less fuel and variable O&M included in base rates divided by sales
  - Collected for the shorter of 3 years or the life of the measure
- Performance Incentive
  - Tiered incentive capped at 15% of program costs for savings exceeding 110% of target



## Why Does it Matter?

Vicious Cycle from Disruptive Forces



Figure from EEI: Disruptive Challenges: Financial Implications and Strategic Responses to a Changing Retail Electric Business, January 2013 See also: Bloomberg Businessweek: Why the U.S. Power Grid's Days Are Numbered, August 22, 2013



#### **Questions/Comments**

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