

# Shareholder Performance Incentive Design for Energy Efficiency Resources

## Best Practices, Pitfalls and Guidelines

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## Overview

- ▶ Why have Performance Incentives (PIs)?
- ▶ Do they work?
- ▶ Existing models
- ▶ Purpose of PIs and importance of the regulatory context
- ▶ What are you trying to encourage?
- ▶ Key features for a comprehensive and effective framework
- ▶ Common problems that should be avoided
- ▶ Appropriate levels of reward




## Objectives and Purpose for PIs

- ▶ PIs primary purpose is to better align societal/ratepayer interests with those of utility (program administrator (PA)) shareholders.
  - Lack of alignment under traditional regulatory structures creates disincentives for utility pursuit of efficiency
    - Lost revenue
    - Lost earnings from building ratebase
  
- ▶ Therefore, **regulatory context can drive factors in PI design.**

## Considering the Regulatory Context

- ▶ Overarching policy goal should be to ensure:
  - PA is highly motivated to achieve exemplary performance, *while also*
  - Minimizing costs to ratepayers to no more than necessary to achieve above outcome
- ▶ This will be different depending on situation:
  - Does decoupling exist?
  - What is ROE?
  - What kind of load growth exists?
  - What is financial health of PA?
  - What mandates exist (legislative or regulatory)?
  - What are stakeholder perspectives?
  - Do rates embed DSM plans within forecasts?
  - How aggressive are goals?
  - What is PA capability and experience?

## Does the Rat Smell the Cheese?



Hayes, Sara, et al. Carrots for Utilities: Providing Financial Returns for Utility Investments in Energy Efficiency. ACEEE. January 2011.

## What Are The Most Important Desired Outcomes? — Tying PIs to Desires

- ▶ Need to understand what you want to motivate or discourage in terms of performance
- ▶ Virtually all PIs focus heavily and in some cases solely on savings/benefits.....but....
  - Is that the only outcome we care about?
- ▶ Importance of multivariate framework
- ▶ Distinguish objectives between:
  - Correlated outcomes
  - Reinforcing outcomes
  - Independent outcomes
  - Competing outcomes

## Guiding Principles...PIs Should Be:

- ▶ Performance-based — outcomes not activities (at least mostly)
- ▶ Objective, unambiguous, measurable, verifiable and achievable but aggressive
- ▶ Scalable
- ▶ Multivariate
- ▶ Supported by but not driving EM&V

*And, for extra credit...*


- ▶ Long term (greater than annual)

## Types of PIs

<b>Type</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b># of States</b>
<b>Shared Savings</b>	Incentive is given as a percentage of net benefits from EE	12
<b>Performance Target</b>	Incentive is given as a percentage of EE program, dependent on Utilities' ability to meet one or more performance metric	5
<b>Rate of Return</b>	EE costs are capitalized over the life of the installed measures, and the utility is allowed to earn a rate of return similar to that of supply-side investments	2
<b>Save-a-Watt</b>	Allows the utility to earn a percentage of their authorized rate of return on avoided supply-side costs due to EE programs.	1



## Examples of Primary Metric – Selected States



## Performance-Based

- ▶ Avoid rewarding activities, focus on outcomes
  - Allow PAs flexibility regarding activities, while focusing on results
  - Don't want to lock in activities that may turn out to be ineffective


## Objective, Unambiguous, Measurable, Verifiable -- “Perfection Can Be The Enemy of the Good.”

- ▶ Is performance measurement subject to contentious debates?
  - Can a highly correlated metric eliminate contention while creating similar incentives?
- ▶ Clarity of language is essential
- ▶ Define up front how will be measured, issues of retroactive vs. prospective adjustments, deeming, NTG ratios, etc.

## Scalable


- ▶ Scalability should encourage continued performance focus no matter what expectations are for year end
- ▶ Without scalability, perverse incentives can result
  - If know can't meet target or will definitely meet, may stop trying hard if no incremental rewards for better performance
- ▶ Need to think about threshold levels, inflection points, caps, and overall levels of reward at each step.

## Scalable – A Tale of Two States



### California

No upside cap until 130% of goal



### New York

No benefit to over achieve goal

## Life is Multivariate – We *Can* Juggle Multiple and Competing Priorities

Do we care only about resource acquisition?

▶ Single savings or benefits metrics can create perverse incentives that may discourage other important objectives (e.g., equity, comprehensiveness, market transformation, etc.)



## Multivariate, cont.

- ▶ PIs should reflect the complex basket of key objectives for long term successful and sustainable DSM – but be limited in number and still performance-based where possible
- ▶ Pitfalls of highly correlated metrics – (e.g., savings and net benefits metrics). Are they improving overall incentives or just adding complexity?
- ▶ Important countervailing objectives are most critical to include to provide a healthy tension between goals
- ▶ Minimum Qualifying Criteria are an option – Should be things considered critical to overall success, in control of program administrator, and low risk. Activities may be appropriate here.

## Multivariate – Illustrative Example

			Targets/Rewards		
Metric	Description	Financial Weight	Threshold	Design	Exemplary
<b>Savings Goal</b>	Achieve X KWh annual savings	70%	80% of goal	100% of goal	125% of goal
<b>Minimum Qualifying Criteria - Low Income Equity</b>	Allocate minimum of X% of portfolio budget to LI programs	0%	X=??		
<b>Depth of Savings</b>	Achieve an average of 20% whole building savings among participants in program X	10%	X=0.8*Y	X=Y	X=1.25*Y
<b>Cost Efficiency</b>	Achieve reductions in portfolio cost/first year savings	10%	20% of ratepayer savings (calculated based on goal \$/KWh and actual achievements)		
<b>Penetration among hard to reach in Program A</b>	Capture X projects in tenant-occupied space in program A	10%	X=0.8*Y	X=Y	X=1.25*Y



## Financial Levels

- ▶ Balancing reward and risk – Establish level in local financial and regulatory context
- ▶ Most PIs target 3-14% of program spending
- ▶ Levels can be made equivalent under any model, *but do the math*
- ▶ You don't need large rewards for effective incentive – 5-10% usually plenty
- ▶ Existence of PI metrics often more important than \$ amount.
- ▶ Penalties vs. Rewards -- Is a \$ lost = a \$ not gained?
- ▶ Setting threshold eligibility and inflection points – can be structured with progressive rewards

## A Word on Timing

- ▶ Most PIs are annual targets, aligned with annual goals and budgets
- ▶ Benefit is primarily identification and provision of annual earnings to Shareholders
- ▶ Disadvantages include:
  - Inordinate focus on short-term actions and artificial deadlines
  - Little incentive for spending on longer term market transformation, building pipelines, etc.
  - Increased EM&V costs may be driven by PI framework. Can result in less resources for other EM&V research that may provide more benefits?
  - Regulatory burden

Thank You

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