


# Modeling the Energy System:

## Creating Evolutionary Models

Useful to Evaluating a Full Range of Policies



Prepared by John S Hoffman  
President

WorkSmart Energy Enterprises Inc.

hoffman@etollc.com

7 November 2006

## Economists Assert and Policy Makers Have Tended to Agree

- Costs of limiting global warming are high
- Raising prices
  - Is the least expensive means to reduce global warming
  - Taxes or ‘Cap and Trade’

Is this assertion  
scientifically valid ?

## Why do most economists make such claims

- Economy already efficient
  - Buyers
  - Producers
  - Transaction facilitators
- Supply curves
  - No diminishing marginal cost
- Innovation fixed (or static)
  - Exogenously determined

The claims are disproved by a large body of evidence

## Energy Models Are Flawed in Assumptions

- Buyers not efficient
- Supply curves
  - Slope down with increasing volume
- Innovation endogenously determined
  - Speed and magnitude of market acceptance important
  - Perceptions of future
  - Institutional supports

# Energy Models Are Flawed in Process Representation

## Models Now

- Static behavior
  - Producers
  - Buyers
  - Institutions
- Policies primarily influence price
- Response to price tends to be fixed

## Reality

- Behavior is changing
- Agenda setting/mindshare is critical
- Responses to prices and stimuli vary
- Prices often peripheral

# Reminder


## Relationship Between Service, Work, and Energy (Lighting Example)

We want Services

Not to use energy

Inefficiency means energy can be reduced at a profit

Innovation means there will be greater opportunities



# Enormous body of evidence:

Buyers Of Products And Services

Using Energy



Do Not Act Like Economically 'Rational Investors'

1. **Habit** dictates **most** purchases
2. **Some** buy lowest first cost products that meet desired attributes
3. **Fewer buy** products with efficiency as attribute
  - But do not buy 'enough' efficiency
  - Fewer use simple rules of thumb like a two year payback
4. **Very few** use net present value after taxes
  - Cost of capital (or alternative investment return)
  - Long term stream of savings
  - Investment of savings
  - Net present value or future value of options
5. **Results**
  - Large cache of untaken opportunities to improve energy intensity
  - Dynamic efficiency (innovation) lags due to lack of market pull

**Efficiency is a peripheral buying issue**

## Habit

## Economic Logic

|  | Versus  |  |
|---|---|---|
| \$85.00   | True Cost Over Ten Years  | \$23.16   |
| 3500  | Color Temperature   | 3500 to 6000  |
| 100   | CRI   | 85  |
| \$8.00  | Cost to operate 1000 hours at \$0.08 per kWh hour for 100 watt equivalent light | \$2.16  |
| n.a.  | Internal Rate of Return for Extra 'Investment'                                  | 147%  |
| 10  | Times Bulb Must Be Changed Over Ten Years                                       | 1   |
| \$.50   | Purchase Price  | \$2.00  |



## ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF REPLACING INCANDESCENTS WITH CFLS & WITH MORE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY

|  | INCANDESCENTS     |  | CFLS                    |  | Advanced Technology    |
|--|-------------------|--|-------------------------|--|------------------------|
| Sockets  | 3,044,140,030     |  | 3,044,140,030           |  | 3,044,140,030          |
| Lamps sold each year                                 | 2,000,000,000     |  | 200,000,000             |  | 200,000,000            |
| Hours on   | 657               |  | 657                     |  | 657                    |
| Typical Wattage                                      | 50                |  | 9                       |  | 4.5                    |
| Cost per kWh   | 0.08              |  | 0.08                    |  | 0.08                   |
| Cost of lamps  | \$0.50            |  | \$2.00                  |  | \$2.50                 |
| kWh Used   | 100,000,000,000   |  | 18,000,000,000          |  | 9,000,000,000          |
| Cost of energy cost/yr                               | \$8,000,000,000   |  | \$1,440,000,000         |  | \$720,000,000          |
| Cost of lamps per year                               | \$1,522,070,015   |  | \$400,000,000           |  | \$500,000,000          |
| Total Annual Cost                                    | \$9,522,070,015   |  | \$1,840,000,000         |  | \$1,220,000,000        |
| Net present value of energy used over next 100 years | \$93,228,665,426  |  | \$16,781,159,777        |  | \$8,390,579,888        |
| Net present value of energy plus lamps               | \$110,966,234,952 |  | \$21,442,593,048        |  | \$14,217,371,477       |
| <b>NET BENEFIT CFL OVER INCANDESCENT</b>             |                   |  | <b>\$89,523,641,904</b> |  |                        |
| <b>ADDITIONAL DYNAMIC BENEFIT</b>                    |                   |  |                         |  | <b>\$7,225,221,571</b> |
| <b>GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION</b>                      |                   |  | <b>82%</b>              |  | <b>91%</b>             |
| Term   | 25                |  |                         |  |                        |
| Discount rate  | 7%                |  |                         |  |                        |

What can be done???? Prices Have Not Worked

Make it easy !!!!!

Find policy  
to reduce  
first cost of products  
to products with lowest true cost  
&  
Make buying efficiency a habit

## How to Get Solution: Three Options

- Efficiency standards
- Taxes on product at sale related to energy used
- Transaction bridges

# Standards

Minimum lumens

per watt

# Evaluation of Option: Standards

## DISADVANTAGES

- All benefit goes to the buyers
- Manufacturers finance transition
  - Absorb risk in transition
- Tendency towards political gridlock in setting standards
- Lack of continuing incentive for manufacturers
- Rarely are standards set at best point economically
  - Due to political process

## ADVANTAGES

- Setting standards is very simple to understand

## Set tax on lamps: Light Bulbs

- Set tax on lumens/watt
- Advantage Over Efficiency Standard: some dynamic efficiency
  - Continuing incentive to produce better lamp



## Option: Create Transaction Bridges

Transactions bridge:

a form of social infrastructure

that creates market intermediaries

to achieve more effective market

## Transaction Bridges Already Exist

- Grid acts as agent for buyers
- Assures future power available
  - Constant voltage
  - Provides whatever supply demanded
  - Finances expansion
  - Allocates cost
  - De-regulation has not changed much
- Buyers power never worry



# Energy Supply: Transaction Bridge

(Currently the grid operates as a transaction bridge for buyers of power)

Generators



\$\$\$

Grid Operator Assures  
Power Supply  
Purchasing MWH




\$\$\$

End Users  
Send Dollars to  
Load Serving  
Entities

# Buyer Never Worries

## No matter how inefficient product


- Grid invests in new generation
- Everyone shares cost
  - End user does not finance/buy new capacity



## No Equivalent Transaction Bridge For More Efficient Products

**Buyers on their own:  
inefficient products**

**Result: Grid spends  
more on costly  
generation**



# Option: Transaction Bridges


(Including Fair Treatment of Producers of Efficient Products)

Generators



\$\$\$

Grid Operator Assures  
Power Supply  
Purchasing MWH



\$\$\$

End Users  
Send Dollars to  
Load Serving  
Entities

CFL Makers  
Get paid



For **negawatt hours**:  
Long term sale


**Based on agreement**

That they always  
Accept less than  
Generators

Each nkWh paid  
At percent  
Of lowest cost  
For dispatch  
Of power


# Result of Transactions bridge

- Manufacturers
  - Lower Price to gain market share
  - Revenue stream from energy savings very profitable
- Markups Avoided
- Scale Economies
- *CFL become lowest priced product*
- *Incentive for dynamic efficiency: Innovation*



| Differences between Transaction bridges and IRP/DSM | DSM & IRP  | TRANSACTIONS BRIDGES  |
|---|--|---|
| GOAL  | Meet energy service needs at lowest resource cost to society                                   | Same  |
| GRID IMPLEMENTATION                                 | Planning model<br>Programs   | Integral to grid operation  |
| PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION                              | Usually rebates with fixed budgets<br><br>Starting and stopping<br><br>Target usually buyers   | Part of daily auction<br><br>No budget limits<br><br>No starting and stopping<br><br>Target producers of products |
| BUYER MOTIVATION                                    | Buy down<br><br>Investment basis remains   | Producers lower prices to sell<br>Producers support to sell<br>Lower prices<br>New habit                          |
| PRODUCER ATTITUDE                                   | Dislikes starts and stops<br><br>Dislikes regulator control of rebates<br><br>No direct profit | New revenue stream becomes major motivating factor in:<br>Marketing<br>Pricing<br>Distribution<br>R&D             |

# Scale Economies Ubiquitous: Marginal Costs decrease with increasing sales




|   | <b>Option 1: Obsolete Technology (Still Currently Used)</b> | <b>Option 2: Standard High Efficiency Technology</b> | <b>Option 3: Better Efficiency Technology</b> |
|---|---|--|---|
|   | 4 T-12s   | 3 T-8s   | 3 T-5   |
|   | Magnetic Ballasts   | Electronic Ballasts                                  | Electronic Dimming Ballast                    |
|   | Standard Fixture  | 3 Lamp trouffer                                      | Optimized Fixture                             |
|   | Manual On/Off   | Timers   | Occupancy Sensor and Light Sensor             |
|   |   |  |   |
| Estimated Cost as standard                            | not available in new  | \$72.00  | \$72.00                                       |
| Lamps wattage   | 160   | 96   | 84  |
| Ballast energy  | 32  | 12   | 8   |
| Ballast factor  | 0.95  | 0.9  | 0.8   |
| Lumen watt ratio                                      | 60  | 85   | 105   |
| Lumen Output  | 9120  | 7344   | 7056  |
| Watts   | 182.4   | 97.2   | 73.6  |
| Fixture efficiency                                    | 0.6   | 0.8  | 0.9   |
| Delivered lumens to work surface                      | 91.2  | 69.12  | 60.48   |
| Switching off when not needed/On Hours                | 5000  | 3000   | 2500  |
| kWh peak price Washington DC (includes demand charge) | \$0.25  | \$0.25   | \$0.25  |
| kWh charge off peak                                   | \$0.06  | \$0.06   | \$0.06  |
| Desired Lumens to Work Surface                        | 60  | 60   | 60  |
| Overlighting  | 52%   | 15%  | 1%  |
| Peak Hours  | 3000  | 3000   | 2500  |
| Peak Hours Operating Cost per Year                    | \$136.80  | \$72.90  | \$46.00                                       |
| Off peak charges                                      | \$21.89   | \$0.00   | \$0.00  |
| <b>Cost of Operating</b>                              | <b>\$158.69</b>   | <b>\$72.90</b>                                       | <b>\$46.00</b>                                |
|   |   |  |   |
| <b>kWh Saved/Yr</b>                                   | <b>0</b>  | <b>620,400</b>                                       | <b>728,000</b>                                |




# Transactions Bridge in Auto Sector (go to [www.mpgplus.org](http://www.mpgplus.org))

## MPG Plus™: What it is and How it Works




# Lock Out: New Energy Supplies



# Note

80% keystrokes on home row  
vowels on left, consonants on right



Dvorak Keyboard Layout

Historical lock in causes:

Typists needed to be flexible

OEMS did not want to produce extra machines


Current:

Out of box use for adults, kids start learning on QWERTY

T

## Obstacles for Low or No Carbon Options

- Lack of long term market for purchasing energy
  - Financing billion dollar projects without long term buyer almost impossible
  - Other obstacles cascade, creating lock in
    - Lack of commitment from manufacturers to create new technology
    - Lack of insurance
    - Lack of long term service agreements
    - Lack of experienced engineers



## New Idea Infrastructure Parity

- PVC Pipe: Natural gas companies pay for its installation to carry gas
  - Electric utilities do not pay for its installation to gather solar energy from ground
- Idea: Create Parity by expanding Electric Utility Payment on rate base for solar collecting ground loops
  - With loops geexchange: 1 unit of electric energy moves up to 5 units for heating, hot water, cooling
  - With a 55% efficient combined cycle plant = 275% 'Efficiency'
  - Best gas furnances/95% efficient
  - **NET: 67% Reduction in use of natural gas when powered by combined cycle power plants**

# New Idea

## Utilities finance efficient systems

- Green Credit Card
  - Super efficient houses etc
- Overcomes budget issues for buyers
- Supplements transaction bridges for system of products working together

# New Concepts: Consistent with 60 Years of Prize Winning Economic Research

- Herb Simon (1957 Nobel Prize Winner)
  - Buyers satisfice not optimize
- Alan Blinder: Gordon S. Rentschler Memorial Professor of Economics at Princeton University;
  - former Vice Chairman of Federal Reserve and former member of Council of Economic Advisors
  - 90% industries declining or flat marginal costs
- Kahneman (2002 Nobel Prize Winner)
  - Decisionmakers make many errors in making decisions
  - Far from having capacity to make 'rational decisions
- Coase (1991 Winner of Nobel Prize)
  - Transaction costs always exist
  - Important: finding, evaluating, contracting, monitoring performance etc
  - One cannot understand existence of firm without transaction costs
- Oliver Williamson and many others
  - Expanded scope of work to show many imperfections within and between firms
- Brian Arthur: Increasing returns and path dependency
- Paul Romer, Stanford Professor
  - New growth theory
  - Technological change does not magically appear
  - Product of economic system
  - Much of the change outside market: scientists
  - Institutional issues dominate
- Learning by doing (Arrow: Nobel Prize Winner 1972)
- Douglas North (1993 Nobel Prize Winner)
  - Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
  - Economic transactions depend on myriads of
    - Laws
    - Customs
    - Organizations
    - Standards
    - Property rights
    - Performance varies with how well institutions contend with real problem and opportunities of the transaction streams
- Richard Nelson & Sidney Winter
  - Economy always of equilibrium



## Summary of Evidence

- Economists wrong
  - Costs much lower than apparent
- Economists Wrong
  - Price rises not efficient or effective by themselves
- New Policy Options Needed Based on
  - Realistic portrayal of buying and producer behavior
- Modeling must be evolutionary to be useful

## Most Significant Implementation Issues

- Business as Usual Attitudes
  - Failure to recognize grave threat of global warming and climate to human future
  - Failure to overcome inertia and act decisively
  - False claims of models that extrapolate past to future

# The End



## Supplemental Slides



## Other Potential Opportunities for Strong Attractors

- Ocean Currents
- Solar Thermal
- Advanced Wind
- Safe nuclear
- GAX heating system
- CAES

## New Options Do Not Exclude Old

- Cap and Trade Advantages
  - Creates limit on emissions
  - Brings need for emissions reductions
  - - To top of agenda of many organizations
  - Will raise prices
- R&D Advantages
  - Utilizes more diverse resource pool: Universities etc.

# National Power Purchase Corporation (NEPC) (Strong Attractor)

- Bids for LONG TERM MWH (20 Years):
  - Output of 10,000 MW per year
  - Long term power purchase agreements (PPAs)
  - Portfolio of Low or No Carbon Options
- NEPC re-sells MWH
- Bids for Storage of kWh
- Treasury Risk
  - Difference Between Buy and Sell Price
  - Resolution Risk: Could Go in Either Direction

# New Idea: Strong Attractors to Overcome Lock In/Out

- Examples of strong attractors
  - Government creates guaranteed purchase (National Energy Purchasing Corporation)
  - Corporations band together to create guaranteed purchases
  - Households band together to create guaranteed purchases
- Risks become technological, not commercial
- Cost of being strong attractor
  - Exposure limited to commercial risk
  - Profit potential may eliminate any cost



## Lock In/Lock Out Common Many Fields

- Good technology is locked in or locked out
  - Qwerty Keyboard locked in
  - Superior Key arrangement Dvorak cannot gain market share
- CFC113 Production was locked in in 1980s for electronics cleaning
  - Military specifications required CFC113
  - Other options could not compete
- Future Energy Technology Locked Out Against Proven Technology
  - By Multiple risks {financial, technical, insurance etc)

# Key Concepts of proposed transaction bridges

1. Producers AUTOMATICALLY share value of energy savings
2. Resulting benefits:
  - Reduced transaction costs
  - Reduced cost of introducing new products
    - Means quicker achievement of decreasing marginal cost with scale
  - Organizations will reward energy productivity producing behavior
    - Careers made off efficiency
  - Mark-up amplification eliminated from value chain

# Energy Savings Opportunities Everywhere

- Current products can reduce energy use dramatically
- Un-commercialized proven technologies can save more
  - Greater market pull
- New Technology can produce even greater savings

# Benefit of Marginal Costs For Energy Systems

- Current Situation
  - Inefficient goods sell more, price becomes lower
    - Scale economies lower price more
  - Efficient goods sell less, price becomes higher
    - Lack of scale economies increases prices
  - Pricing through distribution chain raises price differential even more
    - Mark up (gross margin) at each stage multiplies manufacturing cost difference
    - Anecdotal evidence that mark ups demanded are higher for 'niche efficient products'
- Future
  - Lower costs/prices for efficient goods
    - Result from greater sales, thereby increasing economic benefit

# Producers

- Limited number
- Many options unexplored
- Large Knowing/Doing Gap
- Marginal costs decline with volume
- Change can be abrupt

## Stabilizing Human Forcing Will Not Stabilize Climate

- Lag in experiencing warming
  - Past emissions will continue to raise temperature/change climate for decades/centuries just from thermal lag
- As warming occurs, biogeochemical changes will occur
  - Increased respiration of soils
  - Increased forest fires/soil fires
  - Decline in ocean circulation/ carbon emissions
  - Methane hydrate emissions
  - Methane emissions from soils
  - MORE EMISSIONS
- Hadley group considering CO<sub>2</sub> alone
  - Suggests nature will double forcing of humans

## Magnitude of Climate Change Could Be Larger than Standard Range of Uncertainty

- Climate Net: Monte Carlo using many computer runs over internet
  - Tests one by one uncertainties
  - Extends range of possible warming to much higher level
  - Needed: Monte Carlo with many uncertainties simultaneously tested
- Paleo-evidence
  - Past forcings from orbital variations
  - Led to large changes in emissions
  - Consistent with mid range estimate of sensitivity
  - But boundary conditions will be different in future

# Stabilizing Human Forcing Climate

**Total GHG= Sum (output\* energy intensity per unit of output  
\*GHG per unit of energy)**


- Output: Economic activity including growth
- Energy Intensity per unit of economic activity
- GHG emissions per unit of energy

## Probable Reductions Required

CO<sub>2</sub>: 90%  
CH<sub>4</sub>: 25%  
N<sub>2</sub>O: 90% (?)  
HFC: 90%



# New Ideas Can Work to Make Old Solutions More Viable



## IGCC: Potential Major Opportunity

- Coal widely available and inexpensive
- Gasification allows relatively inexpensive carbon sequestration
- Technologies not optimized but proven
  - Technological Improvement possible
  - Scale economies
- Power Costs could be below current average cost
- Barrel of diesel ~\$30